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THE SUPREME COURT IN CONTEMPORARY LIFE
by
Paul A. Freund
T IS a very great privilege to be asked to deliver the first Robert
G. Storey Lecture. Dean Storey is known and honored throughout
this country and abroad for his manifold contributions to law and
the legal order, and to have one's name associated with his, even in
this modest capacity, is an honor indeed.
The role of the Supreme Court can best be viewed in the perspec-
tive of time. Some missions of the Court have remained constant, or
fairly so, over the years. The Court has stood almost from the be-
ginning as an arbiter or umpire of the federal system. By standing
ready to adjudicate suits between states over such conflicts as bound-
aries, the apportionment of interstate waters, and the escheat of in-
tangible property, the Court has served, as has been said, as a sub-
stitute for diplomacy and war.
More broadly the Court has played a vital role in maintaining a
free national market of continental extent, overturning when neces-
sary local trade barriers and commercial preferences. At a time when
Western Europe and other areas of the world are struggling halt-
ingly to achieve a common market, this contribution can hardly be
overstressed. It was not however, a role assumed without protest.
Chief Justice Taney (and here The Jacksonian was echoing the view
of the arch-Federalist Chief Justice Kent of New York) could not
bring himself to declare that an act of the state was in violation of
the commerce clause of the Constitution where no federal statute had
interposed the national will.1 But Marshall's position,' that the power
granted to Congress, even though unexercised, established a negative
duty on the states which the courts were bound to enforce, carried
the day,' and fortunately so, for the variety and ingenuity of state
parochial laws in the field of trade are such that a case-by-case judicial
scrutiny is highly valuable if not indeed essential.
Similarly, the Court has served our federal system in the basic
function of assuring the uniformity of federal law, whether through
statutory or constitutional interpretation. This mission requires, of
course, the review of state court decisions, an authority which was
* Professor of Law, Harvard University; A.B., Washington University, 1928; LL.B.,
1931, S.J.D., 1932, Harvard University. Editor-in-Chief, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT.
'License Cases, 5 How. 504 (1847).
: Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
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bitterly contested in some quarters in the early 19th century. When
Marshall declared that the decisions of the highest court of the state
applying its criminal law were thus reviewable under the Constitu-
tion,' he drew a violent attack from Judge Roane of the Virginia
Court of Appeals, the judge who in all likelihood would have been
sitting in his place had the appointment of a chief justice fallen to
Thomas Jefferson rather than to John Adams in the late days of his
administration. Roane declared in a letter that it was "a most mon-
strous and unexampled decision. It can only be accounted for from
that love of power which all history informs us infects and corrupts
all who possess it, and from which even the upright and eminent
judges are not exempt. '
Not all the missions of the Court have been so constant. Others
have shifted from period to period. In this respect the Constitution
is like an enduring work of art: the meaning of its great clauses takes
color from the concerns and capacity, the needs and aspirations of
the time. The great constitutional guarantees of equal protection of
the laws, due process of law, the free exercise of religion, and the
freedom of speech and press all derive meaning and content from the
intellectual and moral climate of the age. There has been in fact a
moving consensus, whereby the fighting issues of one era become
the commonplaces of the next, resolved either for or against the posi-
tion of the earlier court majority.
I have already spoken of the commerce clause in the role of
cementing the Union and the supremacy clause as a basis for review
of state court decisions. In the period following the Civil War the
Court exercised its authority to a predominant degree in safeguarding
capital and burgeoning industry against measures that in the Court's
judgment were hostile. In the one year 1895 three crucial cases were
decided. In Re Debs' ruled that the federal courts themselves, with-
out benefit of an act of Congress, could issue injunctions against
strikes that threaten to impair interstate commerce. United States v.
E. C. Knight Co.! held that a combination of ninety-five per cent of
the sugar-refining capacity of the country did not constitute a re-
straint of trade among the states, since manufacturing is not com-
merce. And the Income Tax' cases held that Congress was powerless
to levy a tax on income from property inasmuch as the tax was a
tax on the source and therefore a direct tax. In combination this
4 Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821).
1 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 555-6 (1932).
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trilogy of cases provoked understandable wrath on the part of labor
and its sympathizers. The spirit of the cases was well-foreshadowed
in a statement by Mr. Justice Brewer, which indicates that he was
performing a labor of love in the decsions two years later:
"To him that hath shall be given" is the voice of Scripture. "From
him that hath shall be taken" is the watchword of a not inconsiderable,
and through the influx of foreign population, a growing portion of our
voters. In such a time as this the inquiry may well be, what factor in
our national life speaks most emphatically for stability and justice, and
how may that factor be given the greatest efficiency? Magnifying, like
the apostle of old, my office, I am firmly persuaded that the salvation
of the nation, the permanence of government of and by the people,
rests upon the independence and vigor of the judiciary.'
It is hardly necessary to say that in these instances the Court over-
reached itself, and the moving consensus became that of its critics.
Slower to be recognized were the guarantees of freedom of speech,
press, assembly and religion as applied against the states under the
standard of liberty and due process of law. In 1907 Mr. Justice
Holmes himself could say, in a case on contempt of court by a news-
paper publication, "We leave undecided the question whether there
is to be found in the Fourteenth Amendment a prohibition similar
to that in the First."'0 In 1920 Mr. Justice Brandeis observed, with
some sharpness, in a dissenting opinion, "I cannot believe that the
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes only lib-
erty to acquire and to enjoy property."" And in 1925, in Gitlow v.
New York," the majority assumed for purposes of the case that free-
dom of speech and press are among the fundamental personal rights
and liberties protected by the fourteenth amendment from impair-
ment by the states. Thus the evolution occurred, from doubt through
protest to assumption.
Today it is these very liberties with which the Court is preoccupied
in the name of the due process and equal protection clauses. But the
basic recognition of these liberties goes back to the 1930's, in the
Chief Justiceship of Charles Evans Hughes. Freedom of the press as
a guarantee against the states was clearly established in 1931 in Near
v. Minnesota." Freedom of assembly was recognized in a provocative
case, De Jonge v. Oregon,4 ruling that it could not be made an
' Address before the New York State Bar Association, "The Nation's Safeguard" (1893).
10 Patterson v. Colorado ex rel., Attorney General of the State of Colorado, 205 U.S.
454, 462 (1907).
"1 Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 343 (1920) (dissenting opinion).
'2268 U.S. 652 (1925).
'3283 U.S. 697 (1931).
14299 U.S. 353 (1937).
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offense to conduct a legitimate public meeting even though under
Communist auspices. State criminal procedure was held up to strict
standards: the right to counsel, at least in the most serious cases, was
established; 5 coerced confessions were held to invalidate a convic-
tion;"6 and the same was true of the knowing use by the prosecution
of perjured testimony." A beginning, too, was made in the direction
of desegregated public education when the Court decided that
Missouri could not satisfy its obligation of equal protection of the
laws by offering Negro university students a subsidized education at
a university outside the state."6 Mr. Justice McReynolds, dissenting,
saw which way the wind was blowing, and he did not like what he
saw. He said:
For a long time Missouri has acted upon the view that the best in-
terest of her people demands separation of whites and negroes in schools.
Under the opinion just announced, I presume she may abandon her law
school and thereby disadvantage her white citizens without impairing
petitioner's opportunities for legal instruction; or she may break down
the settled practice concerning separate schools and thereby, as indicated
by experience, damnify both races. 9
It is no mere coincidence that during the 1930's, when these de-
velopments were taking place, totalitarianism was on the rise else-
where in the world. The dark clouds of repression and inequality
hovering over Europe made us more keenly aware that we could
fortunately look to the Constitution for the blessings of liberty. Nor
was it an accident, I suggest, that the two most notable political dicta-
tors in the United States received their comeuppance in the Supreme
Court at this time. Governor Huey Long was rebuffed when the
Court held that his tax on newspapers, graduated according to the
volume of their advertising and thus directed against the big-city
press, constituted a restraint on freedom of the press in violation of
the fourteenth amendment. Mayor Frank Hague of Jersey City was
rebuked when the Court held that his control over the selection of
speakers in the public square of his city constituted a violation of the
guarantees of freedom of speech and assembly." We are apt to think
of the 1930's in the history of the Supreme Court as a time of con-
flict over economic policies, dramatized in the Court-packing crisis
of 1937. It is well to remember, however, that during this period the
5 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
'e Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
17 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
1"Missouri ex el. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
"Id. at 353.
'*Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
"Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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Court was effectively shaping the guarantees of personal rights that
have loomed so large in the business of the Court ever since.
Today the momentum of this movement has greatly increased.
Despite the variety of forms which the movement has taken and the
diversity of cases it has produced, it can perhaps be summarized under
two large rubrics: responsible government and responsive government.
By responsible government I mean the duty of public authorities
to turn square corners when dealing with the most sensitive interests
of the citizen. In this light responsible government means observing
the symbolic code that we have devised as a condition of using the
criminal law to deprive persons literally of liberty or life. The sym-
bolic code is important not merely, or indeed not so much, because
it protects the defendant as because it protects society, those of us
engaged in the administration of the law, from roaming at large in
the retributive processes of the criminal law. Only by this kind of
self-discipline can we avoid what Justice Holmes called "playing
God" and make tolerable the responsibility of imposing dooms on
our fellow men. In their constraints the judges, and those for whom
they speak and act, must find their freedom.
It is hardly necessary to rehearse the ways in which the symbolic
code has been applied in these later years. The right to counsel has
been extended, and indigence is no longer a reason for proceeding to
trial in a criminal case without benefit of counsel."' Earlier it had
been held, incidentally, that indigence was no longer a sufficient
ground for a state's exclusion of migrants from other states; Mr.
Justice Byrnes observed that indigence could not today be equated
with contagious disease or flight from justice." Evidence obtained as
a result of an illegal search or seizure is no longer admissible in a
state criminal trial.' The possible limits of these new doctrines re-
garding counsel and evidence will be considered in a moment.
By responsive government I mean one which keeps itself open to
the play of criticism, which reflects the will of the electorate, and
which is nourished by an educated citizenry. From this point of view
a number of otherwise disparate new doctrines take on a certain co-
herence. The safeguard of a free press is now held to mean that even
defamatory statements directed at the conduct of public office are
privileged if they are made without malice,"2 that is, without knowl-
edge of their falsity and without a reckless disregard for the question
of falsity. Malapportionment of the legislature has become a jus-
22 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
' Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
24 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'
2 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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ticiable issue under the equal protection clause." And desegregated
public education rounds out this range of decisions directed toward
a more responsive government.
The question should be raised and faced whether some at least of
the new developments may be carried too far, to an absolute or
doctrinaire point where counterconsiderations are neglected. Certain
of the recent decisions are surely not subject to such a charge. In
New York Times v. Sullivan," establishing the new principle of
privilege in political criticism, a more absolute position was in fact
urged by the three concurring justices," who would have set up an
unqualified immunity, thus protecting the press or other speakers
from even the threat of litigation. On balance, however, as the ma-
jority concluded, such a doctrine would have gone unnecessarily far,
giving clearance in advance to the most reprehensible elements in
journalism and political debate. Some of the other decisions are more
arguable from this point of view. In particular, the reapportionment
cases"' have carried the principle of equality to an extreme limit,
insisting upon approximately equal districts for both houses, even
where a departure from that principle has been sanctioned by a
state-wide popular referendum. Perhaps: the result was inevitable
given the starting point of a personal right to a proportionately equal
share in the choice of representatives, whether from one's own district
or from other districts in the state." Had the starting point been
different, had the standard of equal protection been applied not to
the individual voter but to the electoral groups themselves, greater
latitude would have been possible in weighing the reasonableness of
a classification that gave weight to factors other than population,
factors such as geographic area, predominant economic interests, and
a desire to impose some structural checks and balances in the legis-
lative process.
Again a question may be raised for the future about the limits of
right to counsel in the pre-trial stage of criminal law enforcement.
There are some signs that confessions, even though voluntary, may
be excluded if obtained without offering the suspect an opportunity
to confer with counsel." This is a large and involved problem, and it
is to be hoped that before fashioning a uniform rule for the states
20Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
"7Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"s New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
29 id. at 293, 297.
"Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Westberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
"lBaker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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the Court will await the studies and suggestions that will be forth-
coming from disinterested bodies giving attention to the problem,
including the American Bar Association and the American Law
Institute. In particular, attention may be paid to other sanctions
than the exclusion of confessions: possibly a strict time limit on the
period of interrogation together with a requirement that a confes-
sion be confirmd promptly before a magistrate. Another arguable
issue in this area is whether the exclusion of illegally-obtained evi-
dence shall be given retroactive application, or more precisely,
whether it must be applied in the case of collateral attack by con-
victed prisoners whose time for appeal has expired. If, as seems to be
the case, the rule of exclusion is a prophylactic one, designed to give
reality to the guarantee against illegal search and seizure, and if the
intrinsic quality of the trial itself was not affected by the introduc-
tion of such evidence, a limitation of the rule to prospective applica-
tion only would appear adequate to its purpose and not unfair. The
question is presently under submission."
One hears it said that the Supreme Court is the conscience of the
country. How true is the statement? On the face of it, it would be
a sad state of affairs if our collective conscience were in fact entrusted
to nine lawyers who happen to have been appointed to our Supreme
Bench. This is especially so because such an identification of Court
and moral conscience overlooks the difference between that which is
constitutional and that which is morally right or just. Many acts
may pass the test of constitutional validity without necessarily quali-
fying as the wisest or fairest public policy. Sunday closing laws, for
example, may validly deny exemptions to those who close for re-
ligious reasons on another day; "4 but it may be the part of legislative
fairness to extend the exemption in such instances of nonconformist
religious practice. A legislative investigation may pass muster in the
courts because the judges are reluctant to inquire into the motive
of the legislators, and yet public morality might be better served
by desisting from an investigation which has as its object the dis-
crediting of particular individuals.
Moreover, an identification of Court and conscience tends to
obscure the need for constructive measures of reform undertaken
by other branches of government. It is not a healthy polity that is
forever dependent on its courts for the spirit of self-examination
and reform. Indeed, much of the collision course that has been run
" Subsequent to this lecture retroactive application of the Mapp rule was denied in
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
'McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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by legislators and judges might have been avoided had the legislative
impulse for correction been stronger. We waited too long before
recognizing the essential justice of providing legal aid for the in-
digent defendant. We failed for too long to provide sanctions against
illegal searches and seizures that might have made the exclusion of
evidence unnecessary. A procedure, for example, that subjected state
or local government to a civil action by the victim of such a search
would have been in many ways a more satisfactory sanction and
might have relieved the Court of the necessity of turning to the law
of evidence. Still on the agenda are such pressing matters as the
problem of bail and possible substitutes that do not place so great a
premium on economic advantage, and the problem of pre-trial pub-
licity in criminal cases with its impact on the fairness of a jury trial.
If we are to avoid an ever-increasing occupation of the field by the
Supreme Court, the way is open through greater resourcefulness and
greater diligence in our internal legal housekeeping.
When all this has been said, it remains true that the Court has
made some great contributions to our moral thinking. Working
within the framework of litigation that comes before it, the Court
has sharpened our understanding of equality, the basic equality that
does not depend on comparing value or merit but that inheres in
the intrinsic worth of a human being as he stands before the law.
Beyond this, the Court at its best has shown us a way of resolving
conflicts by searching beneath slogans and shibboleths for concrete
points of agreement and difference. In a world beset by the clash and
clamor of conflicting "isms" this is surely a service of the law and of
the Court that reaches beyond their special mission and their time.
At its best the Court exemplifies the wisdom of Lord Acton when
he said, "An absolute principle is as absurd as absolute power," and
again, "When you perceive a truth, look for the balancing truth."
Finally, the Court has set a high moral example in the openness of
its decisions, the exposure of its reasoning and the freedom of dis-
sent. How important this example is, and how much it puts to the
hazard the rationality of the society in which the judges perform,
may be seen by a comparison with the practice elsewhere. In Germany
the Constitutional Court publishes only the prevailing opinion, lest
its authority be weakened by the disclosure of disagreement. It is
rumored that on some occasions dissents have been prepared and
deposited in the archives against the day when public opinion may be
ready to accept a wider exposure to the actual process of deliberation.
In the end, despite its contributions of substance and method, the
quality of our society and our life cannot be made to depend on the
[Vol. 19:439
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Court. Whether the arts and sciences will flourish, whether the aged
and the young are properly cared for, whether reason or passion will
be our guide, these depend finally on ourselves. If the Court is
possessed of neither the sword nor the purse, it is equally not pos-
sessed of the whole tutelage of our people.
It was said by John Maynard Keynes that in a healthy economy the
economists would become no more important to society than dentists:
they would simply be called on for a little repair work now and
then. When the importance of the Supreme Court is similarly scaled
down, it will be a sign that we have achieved a really civilized life.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter used to say that the most important office
in a democracy is that of citizen. As citizens, the American dream
and destiny are ours to shape.
